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LYMAN, his wife, Pl . 1. atn t 
vs. 
NATIONAL MORTGAGE .BOND COR- ···············----"' 
PORATION, a corporation of the State--··· ···c;i;;k:··s~p·;;m;··c~~ri. Utah 
of Delaware, AMALIA V. YBARRA, 
personally; AMALIA V. YBARRA, as 
Administratrix of the Estate of Tomas Case No. 8633 
Velarde, Deceased; SAN JUAN COUN-
TY, a body corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah, and all other persons 
unknown claiming right, title, estate or. 
interest in or lien upon the real prop-
erty described in the complaint adverse 
to Plaintiffs' ownership or clouding 
Plaintiffs' title thereto, D f J t. 
e enuan s. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
KARL R. LYMAN and EDITH K. 
LYMAN, his wife, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
NATIONAL MORTGAGE BOND COR-
PORATION, a corporation of the State 
of Delaware, AMALIA V. YBARRA, 
personally; AMALIA V. YBARRA, as 
Administratrix of the Estate of Tomas Case No. 8633 
Velarde, Deceased; SAN JUAN COUN-
TY, a body corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah, and all other persons 
unknown claiming right, title, estate or 
interest in or lien upon the real prop-
erty described in the complaint adverse 
to Plaintiffs' ownership or clouding 
Plaintiffs' title thereto, D f d 
e en ants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of 
San Juan County quieting plaintiffs' title to several tracts of 
land. The only tract in which the appellants are interested 
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is the SEl~ of the SEl~ of Section 31, Township 32 South, 
Range 24 East, SLB&M. This tract was patented to one Tomas 
Velarde on June 13, 1922. The abstract of title, Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit A, shows no conveyance from Tomas Velarde to the 
plaintiffs or to their predecessors. However, entry 3 of the 
abstract is a (<tax deed" dated December 12, 1941, from 
Frank Halls as County Clerk and also as County Auditor to 
one J. M. Bailey. This deed recites that the County got title 
by an auditor's tax deed dated March 25, 1927. There is no 
auditor's tax deed to the County shown in the abstract. The 
plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of J. M. Bailey. 
If we assume for the sake of discussion of the facts that 
the auditor's tax deed was actually delivered on March 25, 
1927, it would have to have been based on a sale for failure 
to pay 1922 taxes. Any tax levy in 1922 would be void be-
cause as shown by defendants' Exhibit 1, the homestead pro-
ceedings were in the early stages on January 1, 1922, and the 
property was not taxable on that date. It was part of the 
public domain. 
It was stipulated by the attorney for the plaintiffs that the 
auditor's affidavit required by Title 59, Chapter 8, Section 7, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 \vas not attached to the assess-
ment roll (Trans. 10). The case was tried upon the assumption 
that the tax title was void and that the only theory upon which 
the plaintiffs could prevail was that they had acquired a title 
by adverse possession. The testimony of Karl R. Lyman (Trans. 
5-9) shows all of the elements necessary to prove title by 
adverse possession, except one. The plaintiffs failed to show 
payment of nall the taxes which have been levied and assessed 
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upon such land according to law." The plaintiffs offered in 
evidence Exhibit B, as follows: 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This is to certify that the taxes on the following described 
real estate situated in San Juan County, State of Utah, were 
paid as below indicated: 
Towns hip 32 South, Range 24 East, SLM, Section 31: 
The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter. 
Year Date Paid By Whom Paid Redeemed By Date 
1955 9-29-55 Karl R. Lyman 
1954 Tax sale Karl R. Lyman 5-17-56 
1953 11-13-53 Karl R. Lyman 
1952 11-29-52 Wallace Bailey 
1951 Tax sale Karl R. Lyman 5-17-56 
1950 9-22-50 Not shown 
1949 Tax sale 
1948 Tax sale Mrs. Arthur Holt 9-22-50 
1947 11-3-47 Reta Bailey 
1946 Tax sale 
1945 Tax sale K. R., Bailey 2-20-47 
1944 12-4-44 K. R. Bailey 
1943 11-30-43 J. M. Bailey 
1942 11-6-42 J. M. Bailey 
1941 No Tax Charged, County Land on January 1, 1941. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 14th day of 
September, 1956. 
(Seal) 
Is/ Joy James 
Joy James, Treasurer 
San Juan County, Utah 
The trial court made the usual finding of fact as to the 
color of title, and that the plaintiffs and their predecessors 
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have had ((sole, exclusive, open, notorious and hostile possession 
of the said land" since 1941, and 
((6. That from December 12, 1941 to date of judgment, 
the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest have paid all 
taxes assessed against said parcel No. 1." Elsewhere in the 
findings of fact it is stated that parcel No. 1 is the land in-
volved in this appeal. 
The decree is in the usual form quieting title in the plain-
tiffs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Payment of taxes each year for the statutory period 
before they become delinquent is necessary to establish title 
by adverse possession. 
2. The plaintiffs still have the burden of proving all 
elements of adverse possession despite the 1951 amendments 
to the statute relating to limitation of actions. 
3. There is no proof that the plaintiffs are Hholders of a 
tax title'' within the meaning of the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
1. PAYMENT OF TAXES EACH YEAR FOR THE 
STATUTORY PERIOD IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH 
TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
Exhibit B, copied above, shows that neither the plaintiffs 
nor their predecessors in interest paid taxes before they became 
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delinquent for any period of more than three consecutive years 
since the county deeded the land to]. M. Bailey in 1941. There 
was only one time when taxes were paid for three consecutive 
years namely 1942, 1943 and 1944. Tax sales for two years 
intervened in 1945 and 1946. Since 1946 there was only once 
when the taxes were paid for two consecutive years before 
they became delinquent. The evidence is, therefore, clear that 
taxes were not paid every year for seven years to meet the 
requirement of section 78-12-12.1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
or for four years to meet the requirement of the proviso of 
said section. Redemption is not ((payment" within the meaning 
of the statute. 
It is well established by the case of Bowen v. Olsen, 2 
U ( 2d) 12, 268 P. 2d 983, that the language ((payment of 
taxes" in section 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953 requires the payment 
of taxes before they become delinquent in order to establish 
a title by adverse possession. The redemption from a tax sale 
cannot be considered the payment of taxes. After reviewing 
the authorities the court said: 
((For the foregoing reasons we hold that the redemp-
tion of the property from the County in 1949 did not 
meet the requirement of the statute as to the payment 
of taxes in 1947 and 1948, and therefore the trial court 
properly held that the plaintiffs failed to establish their 
claim to the land in question by adverse possession.'' 
The statute construed by the Court in the Bowen case 
was amended by Laws of Utah, 1951, Chapter 19, to provide 
as follows: See pocket part, Vol. 9, DCA 1953, p. 9) 
78-12-12.1. 
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Possession and payment of taxes-Priviso-Tax title. 
-In no case shall adverse possession be established 
under the provisions of this Code, unless it shall be 
known that the land has been occupied and claimed 
for the period of seven years cont~nuousl y, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all 
the taxes which have been levied and assessed upon 
such land according to law. Provided, however, that 
payment by the holder of a tax title to real property 
or his predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed 
upon such real property after the delinquent tax sale 
or transfer under which he claims for a period of not 
less than four years and for not less than one year 
after the effective date of this amendment, shall be 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this section in 
regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish 
adverse possession. 
It will be noted that the amended statute still requires the 
rr payment of taxes" for a period of not less than four years 
to establish a case of adverse possession. The words ((according 
to law" are not repeated in the proviso but the words ((payment 
of taxes" are repeated. It will be observed that in the Bowen 
case this Court based its decision on the words Hpayment of 
taxes" and did not pay any attention to the words ((according 
to law." The Court said. 
More aligned with reason and persuasion are the 
grounds courts have given as a basis for adopting the 
majority rule: HPayment of taxes" and ''redemption 
of taxes" have two separate and well defined mean-
ings; redemption is not "payment" because it is only 
where the taxes have not been ttpaid" that there is 
a forfeiture and any need for redemption; a payment 
made after the land has been sold for taxes is not 
made to discharge a claim for taxes but to redeem the 
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land from the sale and reinvest the owner with legal 
title. 
In view of the failure of plaintiffs to show payment of 
taxes for more than three consecutive years, they have failed 
to prove adverse possession-the only possible theory under 
which they can succeed. 
2. THE PLAINTIFFS STILL HAVE THE BURDEN 
OF PROVING ALL ELEMENTS OF ADVERSE POSSES-
SION DESPITE THE 1951 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
STATUTE RELATING TO LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. 
It is elementary that in a quiet title action the plaintiff 
tnust rely upon the strength of his own title and not the weak-
ness of the defendants' title. 
In 74 C.J.S., p. 41 the rule is stated as follows: 
As a general rule, one seeking to quiet title or re-
move a cloud thereon must succeed on the strength of 
his own title, and not on the weakness of his adver-
sary's title, and want of title in plaintiff ordinarii y 
renders it unnecessary to examine that of defendant. 
This means that if the quiet title action is based upon 
the doctrine of adverse possession all elements must be proved 
by the plaintiffs to make a case. 
It was contended in the district court that sections 78-12-5.1 
and 78-12-5.2 prevent the interposing of any defense to this 
suit by the defendants because they had not actually occupied 
or been in possession of the property within four years prior 
to the commencement or interposition of such action or defense. 
These sections provide: 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78-12-5.1-No action for the recovery of real prop-
erty or for the possession thereof shall be maintained, 
unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or 
possessed of such property within seven years from the 
commencement of such action; provided, however, that 
with respect to actions or defenses brought or inter-
posed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet title 
or determine the ownership of real property against 
the holder of a tax title to such property, no such action 
or defense shall be commenced or interposed more than 
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, 
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person com-
mencing or interposing such action or defense or his 
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession 
of such property within four years prior to the com-
mencement or interposition of such action or defense 
or within one year from the effective date of this 
amendment. 
78-12-5.2-No action or defense for the recovery or 
possession of real property or to quiet title or determine 
the ownership thereof shall be commenced or inter-
posed against the holder of a tax title after the expira-
tion of four years from the date of th sale, conveyance 
or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly 
to any other purchaser thereof at any public or private 
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the 
date of this act. Provided, however, that this section 
shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of the 
legal title to such property where he or his predecessor 
has actually occupied or been in actual possession of 
such property within four years from the commence-
ment or interposition of such action or defense. And 
proyided further, that this section shall not bar any 
defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder 
of a tax title, to the effect that such city or town holds 
a lien against such property which is equal or superior 
to the claim of the holder of such tax title. 
10 
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It is settled that statutes of limitations must be pleaded 
or covered by a pre-trial order or discussion; otherwise they 
are deemed waived. In this case they were not pleaded, nor was 
there any pre-trial. They must therefore be considered waived. 
If we assume for the sake of argument only that they 
are to be considered, it is apparent that they are not applicible 
to this case. 
The legislature obviously intended to permit the pleading 
of the statute of limitations to obviate the necessity of proving 
all of the steps necessary to show a good tax title where the 
tax deed was given more than four years prior to the com-
mencement of the suit. Here that question did not come up 
because the plaintiffs stipulated facts t'hat made the tax title 
invalid, and they relied only upon a title by adverse possession. 
The limitations statutes have no application for a further 
reason. Under the provisions of section 78-12-7.1 (Vol. 9, 
Pocket Parts, p. 9), the person establishing a legal title is pre-
sumed to have been possessed of land within the time required 
by law. There is a ((proviso" for the benefit of a tax title holder 
under which he is presumed to be the owner unless ( 1) the 
owner of the legal title has actually occupied the land, or 
( 2) the tax title owner has failed to pay taxes within the four 
year period. The ((proviso" does not apply in this case because 
the (<tax title owner" has failed to pay all taxes levied or 
assessed within the four year period. The statute is quoted 
with emphasis added: 
78-12-7.1-Adverse possession- Presumption-
Proviso-Tax Title.-In every action for the recovery 
or possession of real property or to quiet title to or to 
11 
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determine the owner thereof the person establishing 
a legal title to such property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; 
and the occupation of such property by any other per-
son shall be deemed to have been under and in sub-
ordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such 
property has been held and possessed adversely to such 
legal title for seven years before the commencement 
of such action. Provided, however, that if in any action 
any party shall establish prima facie evidence that he 
is the owner of any real property under a tax title held 
by him and his predecessors for four years prior to the 
commencement of such action and one year after the 
effective date of this amendment he shall be presumed 
to be the owner of such property by adverse possession 
unless it appears that the owner of the legal title or 
his predecessor has actually occupied or been in posses-
sion of such property under such title, or that such tax 
title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay 
all the taxes levied or assessed upon such property 
within such· four year period. 
It will be noted that the words rrto pay'' are used, and the 
Supreme Court has held that redemption is not the equivalent 
of payment. The plaintiffs cannot show four years of payment 
of taxes, so under 78-12-7.1 the Velarde Estate was presumed 
to have been in possession. Under the plain reading of the 
statute the plaintiffs can succeed only by sho\\ring adverse 
possession and payment of taxes for seven years. 
The plaintiffs are attempting, in effect, to use the limita-
tions statutes quoted above to bolster an inadequate showing 
under the adverse possession statutes. This, they cannot do. 
Unless the plaintiffs make a case, it is unnecessary for the 
defendants to interpose any defense. The title of the Velarde 
' ) 1~ 
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Estate has not been defeated, and the estate is still the owner 
of the property. 
3. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
ARE HOLDERS OF A nTAX TITLE" WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF THE STATUTE. 
Section 78-12-5.3 provides in part as follows: 
The term ((tax title" as used in section 78-12-5.2 and 
section 59-10-65, and the related amended sections 
78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any title to real 
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived 
through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance or 
transfer of such property in the course of a statutory 
proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against 
such property whereby the property is relieved from a 
tax lien. 
The abstract of title, Exhibit A, is the only proof of title 
offered by the plaintiffs. It does not contain an auditor's tax 
deed to San Juan County so there is a gap in the title between 
Tomas Velarde and San Juan County. Furthermore, as indi-
cated above the plaintiffs do not claim title by virtue of a tax 
deed, but merely claim that the deed clothed them with color 
of title sufficient to show adverse possession. If we assume 
for the sake of argument that the limitations statutes are ap-
plicable to this case, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that 
they are holders of a tax title as defined by section 78-12-5.3. 
No sale, conveyance, or transfer of the propertr involved from 
Velarde to the County has been proved and this is essential 
to proof of a ((tax title" even under the liberal language of 
the statute. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear that no title by adverse possession was proved 
by the plaintiffs by reason of their failure to prove the payment 
of taxes, and the Velarde Estate is still the owner of the 
property. The decree of the district court should be reversed 
and the court directed to enter a decree in favor of the de-
fendant, as administratrix of the Velarde Estate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorney for Appellants 
14 
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